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I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 20, 2009, PlaintiffsIAppellants, Ray and Julie Harrison ("the 
Harrisons") filed their Opening Brief on Appeal against the DefendantsIAppellees, Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd's London and NAS, Inc. ("Lloyd's") arguing that the district court 
erred in confirming the arbitration award entered in Lloyd's favor and denying the Harrisons' 
Motion to Vacate that award. The Harrisons further argued that the district court erred in 
awarding attorney fees to Lloyd's. On or about April 17, 2009, Lloyd's filed its 
Respondents' Brief arguing that the Harrisons appeal is jurisdictionally barred, that the 
district court properly confirmed the arbitration award, and that the district properly awarded 
attorney fees to Lloyd's and that Lloyd's is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. The 
Harrisons now submit this Reply Brief on Appeal and respectfully request that the Court 
reverse the district court's confirmation of the arbitration award and remand this case to the 
district court for further proceedings. The Harrisons further request that the Court reverse 
the district court's grant of attorney fees to Lloyd's in this matter and deny Lloyd's request 
for attorney fees on appeal. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. The Harrisons' Appeal is Not Jurisdictional& Barred 
1. - The Idaho Supreme Court has alreadv determined that the 
Harrisons' apueal is not iurisdictionallv barred. 
Lloyd's first argues that the Harrisons' appeal is jurisdictionally barred 
because the Notice of Appeal was not filed within forty-two (42) days of the entry of the 
district court's written decision granting Lloyd's Application for Confirmation of Arbitration 
Award and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award. However, this issue 
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has already been fully adjudicated by the Idaho Supreme Court. On September 25, 2008, 
Lloyd's filed a Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal on this exact same basis. On 
October 3 1,2008, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an Order denying this motion. A txue and 
correct copy of this Order is provided in the Appendix to this Reply Brief. Lloyd's has cited 
to no new facts or case law in support of its current argument that the Ilarrisons' appeal is 
jurisdictionally barred. As such, Lloyd's is seeking to reargue an issue already finally 
decided by this Cow and, therefore, Lloyd's argument on this issue should be summarily 
dismissed. However, in the event the Court decides to address the jurisdictional issue re- 
raised by Lloyd's, the Harrisons have provided argument in opposition to Lloyd's assertions 
below. 
2. Both Idaho Code 6 7-919 and Idaho Appellate Rule 11 provide 
that the Harrisons can appeal from the iudment entered bv the 
District Court. 
Idaho Code $ 7-914 expressly requires that upon the granting of an order 
confirming an award, judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith and be 
enforced as any other judgment or decree. Idaho Code $ 7-919(a)(6) expressly provides that 
judgments or decrees entered by the district court in accordance with the Idaho Arbitration 
Act are appealable. Idaho Code $7-919(b) further provides that "the appeal shall be taken in 
the manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action." 
\ 
Additionally, because this case began as a case in the district court, the judgment entered is 
expressly appealable pursuant to Idaho Rule of Appellate Procedure Il(a)(l) which 
specifically states that judgments entered in a civil action are appealable. Idaho Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 1 l(a)(8) also provides for the right to appeal any appealable order under 
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the Uniform Arbitration Act, Title Seven, Chapter 9 of the Idaho Code. The judgment 
specifically states that the Court is entering judgment against the Harrisons. As such, there 
can be no question that the judgment entered by the district court on August 11, 2008, 
constituted a final judgment from which Appellants were entitled to take their appeal and that 
such appeal includes the right to assert that the Court erred in entering judgment against the 
Harrisons. 
3. - The Order entered Julv 28, 2008 is included in the iudment 
anpealed from nursuant to Idaho Rule o f  Anpellate Procedure 
17(ie)(l)(iB). 
Idaho Rule of Appellate Procedure 17(e)(l)(B) expressly provides that the 
Notice of Appeal shall include a designation of the final judgment, order or decree appealed 
from and that such judgment, decree, or order be deemed to include and present on 
appeal all final judgments, orders and decrees entered prior to the judgment, order or decree 
appealed from for which the time for appeal has not expired. Thus, by the express terms of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules the judgment appealed from is deemed to include all prior final 
judgments and orders for which the time to appeal has not expired. Respondents assert that 
the language applies to the prior final judgment and orders for which the time for appeal has 
not run at the time that the Notice of Appeal designating the specific judgment appealed from 
is filed. However, such an interpretation would have the result of allowing an appeal from 
one judgment or order yet requiring the Appellant to calendar the time for filing that appeal 
from the date of entry of a prior order. Such an interpretation is likely to lead to piecemeal 
appeals and the filing of multiple notices of appeal in order to prevent any chance of having 
an appeal dismissed. 
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The more reasonable interpretation and the one most consistent with the 
express language of the Rule is that the judgment appealed from is deemed to include any 
prior final judgments or orders for which the time to appeal has not expired at the time the 
jud~ment appealed from is filed. As is clear from the language of Idaho Appellate Rule 
17(e)(l), the phrase "which shall be deemed to include" clearly refers to the judgment from 
which the appeal is taken. The judgment itself is created only upon filing by the district 
court, and is not affected by the Notice of Appeal. As such, the most reasonable 
interpretation of the Idaho Rule of Appellate Procedure 17(e)(l)(B) is that, at the time that 
judgment appealed from was filed, it incorporated any other final judgments, orders, or 
decrees for which the appeal time had not yet expired. Such an interpretation provides a 
consistent date from which the Notice of Appeal can be filed and prevents any confusion 
regarding whether the time for appeal runs from the judgment or an earlier order which may 
be considered a final order absent the entry of the judgment. 
A fmding of timeliness of appeal in this matter is supported by the Idaho Court 
of Appeals decision in Pichon v. L.J. Broekemeier, Inc., 108 Idaho 846, 702 P.2d 884 (Ct. 
App. 1985). In Pichon, the respondent filed a cross-appeal more than 42 days after the entry 
of judgment but less than 14 days from the filing of the notice of appeal by the appellant. 
See id. at 850, 702 P.2d at 888. However, the cross-appeal was not filed against the party 
who filed the notice of appeal. See id. The cross-respondents argued that the cross appeal 
was untimely because, at that time, I.A.R. 15 provided that "an opposing party" could file a 
cross appeal within 14 days and since the cross-respondents had not filed a notice of appeal, 
Pichon was not an "opposing party" when she filed the cross-appeal. See id. The Court of 
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Appeals rejected this argument and held that I.A.R. could be interpreted to provide that any 
party opposing the original notice of appeal had an additional 14 days to file a cross-appeal 
even as to parties not named in the notice of appeal. See id. In so holding, the Court of 
Appeals noted that the interpretation was consistent with the judicial policy of encouraging 
resolution of legal disputes on the merits. See id. 
Here, the interpretation of I.A.R. 17 is reasonable in light of the language used 
in the rule and the purposes to be served by adding certainty and preventing confusion and 
piecemeal appeals. It further is consistent with the judicial policy of encouraging resolution 
of legal disputes on the merits. Therefore, this appeal is timely filed because it is a timely 
appeal kom a final judgment entered by the district court and incorporates the Order entered 
by the district court on July 28,2008. 
4. - The cases cited bv Lloyd's do not support a dismissal o f  the 
ar.+~eaZ in this matter. 
In support of its motion for involuntary dismissal, Lloyd's first cites to Scaggs 
v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 114, 117, 106 P.3d 440, 443 (2005). The 
Harrisons acknowledge that, in Scaggs, the Court did determine that the Memorandum 
Decision and Order entered by the District Court on October 10,2002 was a f i a l  judgment. 
However, there is nothing in the Scaggs decision that indieates that a judgment was actually 
filed in that case after the district court's ~emoranduh  Decision and Order and prior to the 
expiration of the forty-two days for appeal. In fact, it does not appear that anything was done 
in that case until February 7, 2003. Thus, the issue currently before this Court regarding the 
interpretation of Idaho Rule of Appellate Procedure 17(e)(l)(B) was never before the Court 
in Scaggs. The Harrisons do not dispute that, had no judgment been entered by the district 
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court, the time for appeal would have run $%om the date of the entry of Order denying the 
motion to vacate and granting the motion to confirm the arbitration award. However, a 
judgment was entered prior to the expiration of the time to appeal from the order and, by the 
provisions of the Idaho Appellate Rules, that judgment thereby incorporated the July 28, 
2008 Order. As the appeal was timely taken &om the judgment, the motion to dismiss must 
be denied and nothing in Scaggs supports a contrary decision. 
Finally, Lloyd's cites to Large v. Mayes, 100 Idaho 450,600 P.2d 126 (1979), 
as support for dismissal of this appeal. In Large, the district court entered an appealable final 
judgment on April 19, 1978, on May 3 1, 1978 an amended judgment as to attorney fees only 
was entered, and on June 23, 1978 a "Final Judgment" was entered by the district court. 
Because the Idaho Appellate Rules expressly provide that the time for appeal is not stayed by 
the filing of any motion to determine costs and fees, it is evident that the May 31, 1978 
judgment did not stay the time for appeal from the final judgment entered April 19, 1978. 
The Final Judgment appealed from was not entered until June 23, 1978 well past the forty- 
two days from the time of the entry of the original appealable judgment. Therefore, as with 
Scaggs, the Final Judgment appealed from in Large could not have included the original 
appealable judgment filed April 19, 1978 and the decision in Large does not address the 
issue raised in this case. 
The Harrisons have been unable to find any decisions fiom the Idaho Supreme 
Court or the Idaho Court of Appeals addressing the direct issue raised in this case. The cases 
cited by Lloyd's and other cases reviewed by the Hamisons all dealt with situations where 
there was either no judgment entered, but a summary judgment or other order was deemed to 
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be final and appealable, or where the judgment appealed from was entered more than forty- 
two days after the entry of a final, appealable judgment, order or decree and where there was 
no timely motion filed to stay the time for filing the appeal on the original judgment or order. 
In this case, the language of I.A.R. 17(e)(l)(B) expressly provides that the judgment 
designated on appeal is deemed to include all prior final judgments, orders or decrees for 
which the time for appeal has not expired. At the time that judgment was entered as required 
by Idaho Code 3 7-914, the time for appeal of the order had not expired. As such, the appeal 
is timely filed as to both the judgment and underlying order. Further, because the judgment 
expressly provides that judgment is entered against the Harrisons, and a timely appeal was 
filed from that judgment, the Harrisons axe entitled to assert on appeal that the judge erred in 
entering judgment against them. Therefore, the Harrisons' appeal is not jurisdictionally 
barred. 
B. There is no Legal Basis for the Arbitrator's Award 
Lloyd's first argues that the district court properly confirmed the arbitration 
award because the legal basis for the Arbitrator's award was that Dr. Hartford's use of 
alcohol, in violation of the Disciplinary Order from the Board of Medicine, violated a 
condition of coverage and therefore rendered coverage for the Harrisons' claim void and, 
therefore, the issue of whether the Arbitrator erred in concluding that the Board of Medicine 
determined that Dr. Hartford was using alcohol at the time he provided care and treatment to 
Mr. Harrison is irrelevant. See Appellees' Brief, p. 17. However, as they have throughout 
these proceedings, Lloyd's apparently confuses the legal effect of an exclusion from 
coverage versus a policy provision which renders coverage cancelled or void. 
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If, as Lloyd's asserts, the Arbitrator's unquestionably erroneous finding that 
the Board of Medicine determined Dr. Hartford was using alcohol at the time he provided 
care and treatment to Mr. Harrison is irrelevant because the only issue was whether Dr. 
Hartford violated the Stipulated Order, then the Arbitrator's decision must still be vacated 
because it is a manifest error of law. Simply put, under well established contract principles 
and Idaho law, there is no legal basis for finding that a policy provision excludes coverage 
for any and all claims arising before or after the violation of the policy provision without 
tendering back premiums. See, e.g. Robinson v. State Farm, 137 Idaho 173, 180-181, 45 
P.3d 829, 836-837 (2002); Crowley v. Lafayeefte Life Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 818, 821, 683 P.2d 
854, 857 (1984). Under Idaho law, Lloyd's cannot write a special endorsement rendering 
coverage void for violation of the Stipulated Order and then, when it suits Lloyd's, treat that 
provision as an exclusion despite its express language to the contrary. 
The plain language of the special endorsement provides that a violation of the 
Stipulated Order renders coverage void. See R. Vol. I ,  p. 232, Exhibit 3, Exhibit "A" 
(Rossman SJ Affidavit), Exhibit "Dm (Policy, Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order 
Endorsement (identified as page JH 18). Lloyd's own letter to Dr. Hartford expressly 
informed him that he no longer had malpractice insurance. See R. Vol I ,  p. 232, Exhibit 3, 
Exhibit "A" (Rossman SJ Affidavit), Exhibit "G" (Letter). It is impossible for any 
reasonable person to read that statement and believe that Lloyd's was only denying coverage 
for a single claim. Rather, Lloyd's was clearly and unambiguously Morning Dr. Hartford 
that it was voiding his policy. Having elected to rehse to provide coverage under the policy, 
Lloyd's was obligated to tender back the unearned premiums. See Robinson v. State Farm, 
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137 Idaho 173, 180-181, 45 P.3d 829, 836-837 (2002); Crowley v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 
106 Idaho 818,821,683 P.2d 854, 857 (1984). It is undisputed that no premiums were ever 
returned to Dr. Hartford and, therefore, Lloyd's kept all proceeds from the policy while 
providing no coverage to Dr. Hartford. This is, undisputedly, a recission of the policy. 
Idaho law is clear and undisputed about what is required to make such a recission effective - 
namely, the return of the premiums. See id. 
In effect, Lloyd's has argued that it was entitled to deny coverage of the 
Harrisons' claim based on the unproven allegations that Dr. Hartford was drinking around 
the time he treated Mr. Harrison. Yet, the Arbitrator relied on no language within the special 
endorsement or any other policy provision that would allow Lloyd's to deny coverage 
without taking w steps to determine whether the violation of the Stipulated Order was 
related, in any way, to Dr. Hartford's treatment of Mr. Harrison. See R. Vol. I, p. 232, 
Exhibit 4 (Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman), Exhibit "A" (Arbitration Decision), p. 4. If 
Lloyd's is not required to demonstrate that the violation of the Stipulated Order is related to 
the Harrisons' claims, then Lloyd's has, effectively, voided or cancelled the policy. Lloyd's 
cannot argue that it was entitled to deny coverage for this claim because the special 
endorsement was an exclusion, yet also claim that the alleged exclusion allowed them to 
deny coverage for gg claim arising after the violation of the Stipulated Order. Either the 
policy provision was an exclusion which means that the conduct which triggers the exclusion 
must relate to the claim, or the Special Endorsement was a void provision which allowed 
Lloyd's to void the policy if the provision was violated. 
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If, as Lloyd's argues, the Arbitrator found that Lloyd's was entitled to deny 
coverage for any claim occurring before or after the violation of the Stipulated Order, the 
only legal conclusion that can be drawn from that decision is that the policy was deemed 
cancelled or voided as of the date of the positive alcohol test. However, it is undisputed that 
Lloyd's did not provide any notice of cancellation to Dr. Hartford, nor did Lloyd's tender 
back any unearned premiums as is required by clear and established Idaho law. See R. Vol. 
I ,  p. 232, Exhibit 3, Exhibit "A" (Rossman SJ Affidavit), Exhibit "F' (Deposition of Jeffrey 
Hartford), p. 123, LL 6-8. Further, according to the letter provided to Dr. Hartford, the basis 
for voiding coverage was the December 15, 2003 positive alcohol test, which occurred more 
than a month after November 15, 2003. See R. Vol I, p. 232, Exhibit 3, Exhibit "A" 
(Rossman SJ Affidavit), Exhibit "G" (Letter). Therefore, under Lloyd's own statements, the 
violation of the Stipulated Order occurred after the care and treatment of Mr. Harrison, and 
Dr. Hartford was entitled to coverage of that claim and the Arbitrator's decision constitutes a 
manifest disregard of Idaho law and must be vacated. 
C The Harrisons Never Agreed to the Application of the Idaho 
Arbitration Act to this Matter. 
Lloyd's next argues that the district court properly determined that the Idaho 
Arbitration Act (MA) applies because the parties expressly agreed that Idaho law would 
govern arbitration based upon the self-serving statement contained within the letter sent by 
Lloyd's counsel to counsel for the Harrisons. In support of Lloyd's argument that the silence 
by the Harrisons' counsel was sufficient to create an express agreement to proceed under the 
Idaho Arbitration Act, Lloyd's cites to Eimco Div., Envirotech Corp. v. United PaciJic Ins. 
Co., 109 Idaho 762, 764, 710 P.2d 672, 674 (Ct. App. 1985). However, Eimco is factually 
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distinguishable from the case at hand. In Eimco, the letter indicating the new terms for 
payment also expressly stated that Eimco would continue the work under the "conditions" 
cited within the letter and, in fact, did so. See id. at 763-764,710 P.2d at 673-674. Thus, the 
facts in Eimco clearly demonstrate that Eimco relied upon the general contractor's silence by 
performing its duties under the contract in accordance with the terms of the offer. Lloyd's 
has never provided any evidence to demonstrate that they relied upon the Harrisons' silence 
in any way or incurred any detriment as a result of that reliance. 
Further, it was Eimco who was attempting to argue that silence was not 
acceptance. The Court noted that an "offer may be accepted by silence if 'the offeror has 
stated or given the offeree reason to understand that assent may be manifested by silence 4 
the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to accept the offer."' See id. at 764, 710 
P.2d at 674 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69(1)(b)). The Court then noted 
that "there is no evidence in the record that the general contractor intended to reject Eimco's 
terms." In this case, there is evidence that the Harrisons did not intend to accept Lloyd's 
offer by remaining silent. The affidavit testimony of the Harrisons' counsel establishes 
unequivocably that he did not intend to accept the application of the Idaho Arbitration Act. 
See R. Vol. I, p. 233, Exhibit 8 (Second Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman), 72-3. Therefore, the 
Harrisons' silence regarding the self-serving statement about the application of the Idaho 
Arbitration Act to these proceedings cannot constitute an express agreement that Idaho law 
would apply. 
Finally, Lloyd's fails to address the Harrisons' argument regarding the lack of 
consideration for any such modification to the arbitration agreement. Even assuming that the 
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self-serving statement in the letter from Lloyd's constitutes an offer and the Harrisons 
accepted by silence, the agreement still required consideration and there was no 
consideration for such a modification. The application of the IAA did not change any part of 
the arbitration proceedings and the Harrisons did not receive any additional benefit, nor did 
Lloyd's incur any additional detriment as a result of the modification. Rather, each party 
simply performed the duties they were contractually obligated to perform under the terms of 
the insurance contract. "It is well established 'that a promise to do, or the doing of, what one 
is already bound by contract to do, is not valid consideration."' Great Plains Equipment, 
Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Co., 132 Idaho 754, 769,979 P.2d 627,642 (1999). As such, the 
Federal Arbitration Act, not the Idaho Arbitration Act provides the appropriate procedural 
framework for this case. 
D. The Arbitrator's Decision Should be Vacated Under Either the Idaho 
Arbitration Act or the Federal Arbitration Act. 
Lloyd's next argues that the Harrisons have failed to establish grounds to 
vacate the arbitration award under either the IAA or the FAA. In support of this argument, 
Lloyd's first cites to Idaho cases setting forth the proposition that arbitrators are,the final 
judges of law and fact in arbitration cases and that the Court cannot ordinarily substitute its 
own judgment for the arbitrators. The Harrisons do not dispute this basic legal standard for 
reviewing arbitration decisions, but respectfilly assert that the Harrisons' claim that the 
Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law is much more than an attempt to get the Court to 
second-guess the Arbitrator. There is a vast difference between asking this Court to overturn 
an Arbitrator's decision because the legal or factual issues "could have" been decided 
differently, and askiig this Court to overturn the decision because, absent deliberate 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRlEF - 12 
ignorance of controlling case law and undisputed facts in the record, the decision made by 
the Arbitrator simply could not be made. In this case, the Arbitrator either manifestly 
disregarded the law by ignoring clear and well-established Idaho case law regarding the 
requirement that premiums be timely tendered back where a policy is voided, or manifestly 
disregarded the law by making a legal conclusion that is irreconcilable with the undisputed 
facts in the record. Similarly, asking this Court to overturn an Arbitrator's decision based 
upon the Arbitrator's complete disregard for established procedural rules, rules the parties 
expressly agreed to with the Arbitrator, is not asking this Court to substitute its judgment for 
the Arbitrator. As such, the Hanisons respectfully request that the Court vacate the award 
for the reasons stated with the Opening Brief as well as those set forth below. 
1. - The Harrisons have demonstrated that the Arbitrator's failure 
to disclose that he had knowledge o f  Dr. Hartford's histow of 
L alcohol abuse prior to the arbitration proceedinns substantially 
prejudiced their rinhts. 
Lloyd's argues that the Harrisons have failed to demonstrate that the Arbitrator 
had an evident bias against Dr. Hartford and, therefore, have failed to demonstrate that the 
Arbitrator's admitted knowledge of Dr. Hartford's substance abuse issues is sufficient to 
justify overturning the Arbitrator's award. However, the Harrisons have not argued that the 
Arbitrator had an evident bias against Dr. Hartford. Rather, the Harrisons have argued that 
the Arbitrator failed to properly disclose that he had "serious concerns7' about Dr. Hartford 
based upon a conversation with a fiiend or employee who had been a patient of Dr. 
Hartford's and who had been aware of Dr. Hartford's propensity for substance abuse and 
sub-standard care of patients. See R. Vol. I ,  p. 232, Exhibit 4, (Affidavit of Eric S. 
Rossman), 7 11. Pursuant to both the IAA and the FAA, grounds for vacating the arbitration 
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award exist when the arbitrator is guilty of misbehavior by which the rights of a party have 
been prejudiced. See 9 U.S.C. 3 10(a)(3) and Idaho Code 5 7-912(a)(2). The Arbitrator's 
failure to disclose his "serious concerns" constitutes misbehavior and misconduct within the 
purview of Idaho Code $7-912(a)(2) and 9 U.S.C. 3 10(a)(3). 
Lloyd's argues that the Harrisons cannot argue that the Arbitrator engaged in 
misconduct because the issue was not raised below. However, the issue was expressly raised 
in the Harrisons' Opposition to Defendants' Application for Confirmation of Arbitration 
Award and Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Arbitrator's 
Award. See R. Vol. I, p. 233, Exhibit 9, pp. 6-9 (expressly citing to 9 U.S.C. 5 10(a)(3)). 
Therefore, Lloyd's assertion that the Harrisons have not argued misconduct or misbehavior 
by the Arbitrator in this matter is not supported by the pleadings included in the record in this 
matter. 
Lloyd's next asserts that the Harrisons cannot establish misconduct because 
there is no evidence in the record regarding when the Arbitrator had the discussion with his 
fiiend or employee which informed the Arbitrator of Dr. Hartford's history of drug and 
alcohol abuse and substandard treatment of patients. However, it is irrelevant as to when the 
Arbitrator gained this information. If it was prior to his selection as Arbitrator, he had an 
obligation to disclose that information. Further, if it occurred at any time after his agreement 
to act as Arbitrator in this matter, he also had a duty to timely disclose that information. Due 
to the procedural posture of this case, the Harrisons had no opportunity to take discovery or 
otherwise present testimony regarding when the Arbitrator obtained his outside knowledge 
about Dr. Hartford. Both the FAA and the IAA expressly provide that misconduct or 
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misbehavior which prejudices the rights of a party is grounds for vacating an arbitration 
award. The Harrisons presented evidence of such misconduct and, to the extent there were 
factual issues to be resolved regarding that alleged misconduct, the district court erred in 
failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing where the allegations could be hlly investigated. 
Instead, the district court summarily dismissed the claim based on disputed facts. Therefore, 
the district court's decision should be reversed on this basis and the case should be remanded 
to allow for an evidentiary hearing where factual allegations regarding the misconduct can be 
hlly explored. 
Lloyd's further argues that any misconduct was harmless error because the 
evidence in the record also informed the Arbitrator of Dr. Hartford's history of alcohol 
abuse. However, it is not simply that the Arbitrator had prior knowledge of Dr. Hartford's 
substance abuse history that causes the conflict in this matter. Rather, it is that the Arbitrator 
learned this information from a former patient of Dr. Hartford's with whom the Arbitrator 
had a personal relationship with (either as a friend or employee) and that the Arbitrator 
expressed "serious concerns" regarding Dr. Hartford which indicates that the information 
that the Arbitrator received from the outside source could have created a personal bias 
against Dr. Hartford. Because the Harrisons were standing in the shoes of Dr. Hartford and 
seeking to require Lloyd's to indemnify and defend Dr. Hartford for his conduct regarding 
the care and treatment of Mr. Harrison, any personal bias against Dr. Hartford by the 
Arbitrator could have carried over into the Arbitrator's findings in this matter. The fact that 
the Arbitrator did make two factual findings regarding Dr. Hartford's alleged alcohol use 
while providing care and treatment to Mr. Harrison which were not supported by the record 
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and, in fact, were directly contradicted by the undisputed evidence in the record, indicates 
that the Arbitrator was not neutral and unbiased on this issue. As is set forth in the 
arbitration decision, the Arbitrator found that the Board of Medicine had determined that Dr. 
Hartford way using alcohol while treating Mr. Harrison when, in fact, the Board of Medicine 
reached the exact opposite conclusion. Further, the Arbitrator stated that Dr. Hartford had 
admitted to using alcohol while providing care and treatment to Mr. Harrison when Dr. 
Hartford had repeatedly and unequivocably denied using alcohol while treating Mr. Harrison. 
See Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 27-29. 
As the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court have noted, the 
failure to disclose potential conflicts is grounds for vacating the award. See Commonwealth 
Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148-149 (1968); New Regency 
Prods. Znc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Znc., 50 1 F.3d 1 10 1, 1 109-1 1 10 (2007). The reason for 
such a strict requirement of disclosure is that the arbitrator is not a judge or jury whose 
findings, legal or factual, are subject to appeal. Rather, the arbitrator is chosen by consent of 
the parties to make often unappealable factual and legal determinations. As such, there must 
be additional safeguards and a stricter requirement of disclosure of all potential conflicts to 
ensure that the arbitrator is completely unbiased and objective. The failure to do so 
substantially prejudices the rights of the parties. As such, Mr. Gillespie's conduct meets the 
basis for vacating an arbitration award as set forth in 9 U.S.C. 5 10(a)(3). 
Lloyd's also argues that there is no prejudice because the Harrisons did not 
oppose the possible appointment of an alternative arbitrator who was the law partner of the 
lawyer who represented Dr. Hartford in the Board of Medicine proceedings. However, the 
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situation is far different. The Arbitrator had information gained &om a personal source, ie. a 
Giend or employee, who had been a patient of Dr. Hartfbrd's and who was aware of Dr. 
Hartford's propensity for substance abuse substandard care of his patients. See R. Vol. I, 
p. 232, Exhibit 4 (Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman), 7 11. Further, the Arbitrator told counsel 
for the Harrisons that he had serious concerns about Dr. Hartford. See id. This conversation 
reveals that the Arbitrator did not just have some knowledge about Dr. Hartford's substance 
abuse history, but rather that the he had a bias against Dr. Hartford based upon his personal 
relationship with Dr. Hartford's former patient. This is substantially different than any 
information the alternate arbitrator might have had based on a professional relationship 
between Dr. Hartford and the proposed alternate's law partner. Simply put, had the 
Arbitrator properly informed the parties of his prior knowledge of Dr. Hartford, and the basis 
for that knowledge, the Harrisons would not have agreed to use the Arbitrator in this matler 
because of the Arbitrator's potential bias against Dr. Hartford. See R. Vol. I, p. 232, Exhibit 
4 (Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman), 7 13. 
Finally, Lloyd's argues that the district court properly determined that the 
Hanisons had waived any claim of bias or misconduct by failing to object prior to the 
issuance of the Arbitration Decision. The Hanisons recognize that a party cannot wait 
indefinitely to assert a claim of bias or misconduct, waiting to see if the arbitrator will rule 
for them or against them. However, in determining this issue, the Court should look to the 
entire circumstances which existed at the time. The disclosure was not made to the 
Harrisons' counsel until January of 2008, months after the submission of this issue to the 
Arbitrator. See R. Vol. I, p. 232, Exhibit 4 (Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman), f[ 10. The 
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Arbitrator's decision was received on January 25, 2008, approximately two or three weeks 
aRer the disclosure. See R. Vol. I ,  p. 232, Exhibit 4 (Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman), Exhibit 
"A." At that time, the summary judgment motions had been pending before the Arbitrator 
for at least four months and the Harrisons were experiencing serious financial difficulties. 
Under those circumstances, it was impossible to make an immediate decision to seek relief 
without considering and discussing the various options. However, before the decision could 
be made, the Arbitrator issued his decision. Once the decision was issued, the Harrisons 
timely objected to the conflict in their motion to vacate. Prior to receipt of the decision, the 
Harrisons simply did not have a meaninghl opportunity to object as the disclosure was made 
months after all briefing and arguments had been submitted. As such, the Harrisons 
respecthlly assert that they did not waive their objection and, therefore, the Arbitrator's 
decision should be vacated pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code 3 7-912(a)(2) and/or 9 
U.S.C. 3 10(a)(3). 
2. - The Arbitrator exceeded his powers bv matt- faczu?Z findims 
durinn a summary iudment proceedinn. 
The Harrisons have also argued that the Arbitrator exceeded his powers by 
making factual findings in a summary judgment proceeding. Lloyd's first argues that the 
Arbitrator did not exceed his powers because he did not consider an issue not submitted to 
him by the parties. However, Lloyd's conveniently ignores the other category of cases where 
an arbitrator exceeds his powers - namely, where the arbitrator exceeds the bounds of the 
contract between the parties. The agreement between the parties and the Arbitrator was that 
the Arbitrator would decide the cross-motions for summary judgment based upon the well- 
established rules for s m a r y  judgment. See R. Vol. I ,  p. 232, Exhibit 4 (Affidavit of Eric S. 
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Rossman), 1[ 5. The parties never agreed that the Arbitrator could disregard the summary 
judgment standards. See R. Vol. I, p. 232, Exhibit 4 (Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman), 1[ 7. 
Therefore, the Arbitrator did exceed his powers when he went beyond the bounds of the 
agreement between the parties. 
Lloyd's m h e r  argues that the Arbitrator did not exceed his powers because 
there was no dispute that Dr. Hartford violated the Stipulated Order by drinking alcohol and 
that this violation was the basis for voiding coverage of the Harrisons' claim and, therefore, 
the Arbitrator did not make factual findings based on disputed evidence in a summary 
judgment proceeding. Again, Lloyd's completely misconstrues the argument. The entire 
case before the Arbitrator was based on the question of whether violation of the Stipulated 
Order rendered Dr. Hartford's insurance policy void, allowed Lloyd's to cancel the policy 
upon discovery of such violation, or would exclude coverage for any claims related to the 
violation. There was never any dispute that the Stipulated Order had been violated. The 
question was, as Lloyd's acknowledged, what was the legal effect of the violation of the 
Stipulated Order. 
Lloyd's asserts that the Arbitrator decided that the legal effect of the violation 
of the Stipulated Order, whenever that violation occurred, whether three months before Dr. 
Hartford provided care and treatment to Mr. Harrison or three weeks after, was to allow 
Lloyd's to deny coverage for the Hmisons' claim because Dr. Hartford had violated the 
Special Endorsement and rendered coverage void. What Lloyd's never explains is how, 
under established Idaho law, Lloyd's could render coverage under the insurance contract 
void without tendering back premiums. By rendering such a decision allowing Lloyd's to do 
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just that, the Arbitrator exceeded his powers and engaged in conduct that substantially 
prejudiced the rights of the Harrisons by blatantly ignoring established Idaho law. 
If, however, the Arbitrator decided that the I-Iarrisons' claim was excluded 
because, as the Arbitrator explicitly stated in the decision, the Arbitrator found that the Board 
of Medicine found that Dr. Hartford had used alcohol while treating Mr. Harrison, then the 
decision exceeded the Arbitrator's powers by making a factual finding based on disputed 
facts in the record. Although Lloyd's attempts to cloud the issue by focusing on the fact that 
the evidence clearly supporting a finding that Dr. Hartford had drank alcohol in violation of 
the Stipulated Order, it cannot point to any undisputed evidence which would have allowed 
the Arbitrator to determine that Dr. Hartford was drinking alcohol while treating Mr. 
Harrison. The actual factual findings made by the Arbitrator were completely unsupported 
by any evidence in the record and, in fact, contradicted the express findings of the hearing 
officer who presided over Dr. Hartford's disciplinary proceedings, as well as the findings of 
the Board of Medicine itself. Simply put, the Arbitrator exceeded his powers under the 
arbitration agreement by making a factual fiding that the Board of Medicine determined that 
Dr. Hartford was using alcohol at the time he treated Mr. Harrison based on facts which 
provided absolutely no support for that factual finding. The Arbitrator fiuther exceeded his 
powers when he made the f a c t d  finding that Dr. Hartford admitted that he was drinking 
alcohol at the time he was providing care and treatment to Mr. Harrison when, in fact, Dr. 
Hartford had expressly denied such conduct. See Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 28-29. 
Having determined that the issue of whether Dr. Hartford was using alcohol at 
the time of his treatment of Ray Harrison was dispositive of the issue before him, the 
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Arbitrator's obligation under the agreement to arbitrate was to deny the cross-motions for 
summary judgment and set the matter for a full hearing wherein he would hear the testimony 
on this issue and make his decision based upon this testimony. Because the Arbitrator 
exceeded his powers in this matter, the arbitration award in favor of Lloyd's must be vacated. 
E. The Arbitrator's Decision Exhibits Manifst Disregard of the Law. 
I .  - The Arbitrator made a leaallv dispositive factual findinz that 
was irreconcilable with the undisuuted facts in the record. 
Finally, Lloyd's argues that that the Arbitrator's decision is not legally 
irreconcilable with the undisputed facts in the record. However, the only argument provided 
in support of this position is that it is undisputed that the violation of the Stipulated Order 
triggered the application of the Special Endorsement contained in Dr. Hartford's policy. 
While this is true, it does not address the central question at issue before the Arbitrator, 
namely what effect the Special Endorsement had on the Harrisons' claim. As has been 
discussed previously, there are only three possible outcomes. Either, the violation of the 
Stipulated Order voided the policy, thereby requiring Lloyd's to tender back premiums 
which they did not do; the violation of the Stipulated Order allowed Lloyd's to cancel the 
policy which would have also required a tender back of unearned premiums, as well as a 
factual determination of whether that violation occurred before or after the care and 
treatment provided to Ray Harrison which was never made; or the violation triggered an 
exclusion which required a fmding that Dr. Hartford's violation was to his care and 
treatment of Ray Harrison. 
In this case, the Arbitrator's decision reveals that he found that the Board of 
Medicine determined that Dr. Hartford was using alcohol in violation of the Stipulated Order 
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at the time he provided care and treatment to Mr. Harrison and, therefore, the Harrisons' 
claim was excluded from coverage. See R. Vol. I ,  p. 232, Exhibit 4 (Affidavit of Eric S. 
Rossman), Exhibit "A" (Arbitration Decision). However, this decision is in manifest 
disregard of the law because it ignores legally dispositive undisputed facts in the record. See 
Coutee v. Barington Capital Group, L.P., 336 F.3d 1128 (9" Cir. 2003). The undisputed facts 
in the record demonstrate that the hearing officer at Dr. Hartford's disciplinary proceeding 
expressly found that: 
At the hearing Resuondent denied any use of alcohol durinp the 
period of time that he was seeing patient HRH in the hospital. 
Respondent testified that throughout the patient's hospitalization 
at St. Alphonsus, that Respondent had maintained an active 
medical practice, had administered an alcohol swab test that was 
negative. saw numerous patients and that he had a negative 
urine drug screen on November 19". During this time, 
Respondent interacted on a continuing basis with other patients, 
physicians, and hospital staff regarding patient care and 
treatment. . . . . the record does not suuport a finding that Dr. 
Hartford was actively using alcohol while caring for patient 
or that he was impaired in his care and treatment of the 
patient. 
See Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order, p. 18-19, attached 
as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Erica S. Phillips in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
There is simply no way to reconcile the Arbitrator's finding that the Board of 
Medicine determined that Dr. Hartford was using alcohol while treating Mr. Harrison with 
the undisputed facts in the record which show that the Board of Medicine's hearing officer 
came to the exact opposite conclusion. Further, there is no way to reconcile his statement 
that such a finding was confmed by Mrs. Harrison's testimony with the fact that Mrs. 
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Harrison testified that Dr. Hartford did not seem intoxicated. and that while she smelled 
alcohol it "wasn't like he had just taken a drink, but like he had been drinking prior to, 
possibly the night before." See R. Vol. I, p. 232, Exhibit 3, Exhibit "B" (Phillips SJ 
Affidavit), Exhibit "B" (Deposition of Julie Harrison), p. 106, LL 6-18. By basing his 
ultimate conclusion that the Harrisons' malpractice claim was excluded from coverage on 
facts that are not supported by the record and, in fact, are expressly refuted by the record, the 
Arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law in this matter. Where, as here, the arbitrator 
bases his legal conclusion upon a factual finding that is expressly and undisputedly refuted 
by the record before the arbitrator, it cannot be anything but a manifest disregard of the law. 
See Coutee, 336 F.3d at 1133 (recognizing that a decision that is legally irreconcilable with 
the undisputed facts cannot stand). The Arbitrator's decision is based on the legally 
dispositive fact that the Board of Medicine determined that Dr. Hartford was using alcohol 
while treating Mr. Harrison and that legally dispositive fact is irreconcilable with the record 
before the Arbitrator. 
Lloyd's argues that the Arbitrator's finding regarding the Board of Medicine is 
not a legally dispositive fact because it was merely dicta and did not form the basis for his 
legal ruling. However, it is clear fiom the decision that the factual finding was the basis for 
his legal ruling. The Arbitrator expressly stated: 
("[Ilt is the Arbitrator's decision that the Idaho Board of 
Medicine de t a ined  that Dr. Hartford was using alcohol at the 
time that he was treating Mr. Harrison, which iYas confmed in 
the testimony by Mrs. Harrison, the use of alcohol was in 
violation of the Disciplinary Order, and violated the condition 
for coverage, and therefore excluded coverage for the 
Harrisons' claim." 
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See R. Vol. I ,  p. 232, Exhibit 4 (Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman), Exhibit "A" (Arbitration 
Decision), p. 4. The only reasonable interpretation of the Arbitrator's decision is that he 
determined that the Harrisons' claim was excluded based upon his factual finding that Dr. 
Hartford was drinking treating Ray Harrison. Thus, that factual finding is a legally 
dispositive fact. And because it cannot be reconciled with the undisputed facts of the case, it 
constitutes a manifest error of law. 
Lloyd's M e r  argues that the completely unsupported factual finding is 
irrelevant because there is evidence in the record that Dr. Hartford was drinking around the 
time he treated Mr. Harrison. However, this argument again ignores the express statements 
within the arbitration decision about the basis for the Arbitrator's conclusion that the 
Harrisons' claim was excluded. Additionally, it ignores the fact that the Arbitrator would be 
equally guilty of committing a manifest disregard of the law by making a factual finding that 
Dr. Hartford was drinking while treating Mr. Harrison based on, at best, disputed facts 
presented during a summary judgment proceeding or, at worst, making such a determination 
without any supporting factual basis whatsoever. Therefore, under whichever theory is 
offered by Lloyd's, the Arbitrator committed a manifest disregard of the law. And, as such, 
the Arbitrator's award must be vacated. 
2. - The Arbitrutor manifestlv disregarded Idaho law renardina the 
tenderinn back o f  .ureiniums upon rescission of the contract. 
Lloyd's argues that the Arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law 
regarding the requirement of an insurance company to tender back premiums upon the 
rescission of a contract because the Arbitrator expressly found that the contract had not been 
rescinded. Yet, Lloyd's also asserts that the Arbitrator correctly determined that it did not 
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matter when the Stipulated Order was violated by Dr. Hartford because anv violation at 
time during the course of the insurance contract allowed Lloyd's to void coverage. See 
Appellee's Brief, pp. 17-18. Lloyd's has never provided an explanation of how an insurance 
company can declare coverage for claim void based upon the violation of a policy 
provision, regardless of whether the claim arose before or after the violation of the policy 
provision and regardless of whether the violation had any relation to the claim, without 
rescinding the policy. Lloyd's has admitted that coverage under the policy was void as of the 
violation of the Stipulated Order. In turn, that means that claim by any patient treated by 
Dr. Hartford at any time during the course of the insurance contract was not covered by Dr. 
Hartford's insurance contract. Therefore, Lloyd's apparently asserts it is entitled to provide 
absolutely no coverage to Dr. Hartford, yet retain the full premiums paid and that the 
Arbitrator's decision correctly gave them this right. 
However, there can be no question that the Arbitrator manifestly disregarded 
the law in deciding this matter if, as Lloyd's asserts, the Arbitrator determined that Dr. 
Hartford was drinking sometime in 2003 prior to his care and treatment of Mr. Harrison and, 
therefore, Lloyd's was entitled to void coverage under the insurance policy. Such a 
determination would be in manifest disregard of the law due to the deliberate decision to 
ignore clear Idaho case law that requires a refund of premiums if a policy is voided. See 
Robinson v. State Farm, 137 Idaho 173, 18-181,45 P.3d 829, 836-837 (2002). This is not a 
situation where there is unclear law or a situation where 'there is no binding precedent 
directly on point. In such a situation, the Arbitrator's decision, while possibly in error, 
would nevertheless be hiding. Rather, this is a situation where the Arbitxator could have 
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only reached the decision urged by Lloyd's by deliberately disregarding clear and well- 
established case law. As such, the award must be vacated on that basis alone. 
F. The District Court Erred in Awarding Attorney Fees to Lloyd's. 
In their Opening Brief, the Harrisons argued that the district court erred in 
awarding attorney fees and costs to Lloyd's for the post-arbitration proceedings within the 
district court. In response, Lloyd's argues that the fees were properly awarded under Idaho 
Code 5 7-914, that such fees are solely within the discretion of the district court, and that no 
limits are placed upon that discretion. That is, Lloyd's apparently believes that Idaho Code 5 
7-914 allows for an award of attorney fees to every party who prevails in a post-arbitration 
proceeding, thus resulting in a prevailing party standard for an award of fees under Idaho 
Code § 7-914. In support of this argument, Lloyd's relies on cases &om other jurisdictions 
which upheld attorney fee awards under provisions identical to Idaho Code 7-914 without 
requiring a showing of frivolousness or unreasonableness. 
Howevef, the Harrisons did not argue that fees could only be awarded upon a 
showing of frivolousness. Rather, the Harrisons argued that, based upon the Court's decision 
in Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423,429-30, 80 P.3d 1024, 1030-1031 (2003), the Court set 
forth a specific policy purpose behind allowing an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code $ 7-914. Specifically, the Court held that attorney fees were awardable when the 
challenge to the arbitrator's decision was "ill-founded" or when an award of fees would serve 
the purpose of "encouraging early payment of valid arbitration awards and the 
discouragement of nonmeritorious protracted confurnation challenges." See id. (quoting 
Canon Sch. Dist. v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 882 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Ariz. 1994). The fact that 
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other states may not have established this same standard, or have set forth no standard at all, 
does not affect the standard set forth by this Court in Driver. Thus, the Harrisons 
respectfully assert that there are limits to the discretion of the district court to award fees 
under Idaho Code 5 7-914 and that, in this case, the district abused that discretion. 
Lloyd's Wher  asserts that the district court's award of attorney fees in this 
matter does serve the purpose of promoting early payment of arbitration awards and 
discourages challenges. Lloyd's asserts that it does not matter that there was no award to be 
paid because the award discourages challenges to arbitration decisions. However, this 
argument ignores that the standard identified in Driver specifically references discouraging 
nonmeritorius "protracted" confirmation challenges. In this case, the district court expressly 
found that this was not a "protracted" confmation challenged. See Tr. Vol. 11, p. 15, line 23 
- p. 16, line 1.' And, as there was no arbitration award to be paid, the award of attorney fees 
could not encourage the early payment of an arbitration award. As such, the district court 
abused its discretion by fmding that the award of attorney fees did serve the purpose of 
encouraging early payment of arbitration awards. 
Furthermore, the district court abused its discretion by finding the Harrisons' 
challenge to be "nonmeritorius." In this case, the Harrisons challenge to the confirmation of 
the award was reasonable and meritorious. The Harrisons provided both legal and factual 
support for their claim that the FAA, not the IAA applied to the review of the Arbitrator's 
decision. The Harrisons further provided legal and factual support for their arguments that 
' Following the filing of the Appellee's brief, the Court granted Appellants' motion to augment the record with the 
transcript from the hearing on Lloyd's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. This transcript was lodged with the 
district court and is therefore now part of the record properly before this Court 
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the Arbitrator had exceeded his powers, committed a manifest disregard of the law, and 
failed to properly disclose a possible bias or conflict which prejudiced the rights of the 
Harrisons. If, in fact, the Court's failure to agree with the Harrisons' arguments is a 
sufficient basis, standing alone, to support an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code 5 7- 
914, then that provision has become a prevailing party standard and that is inconsistent with 
the purposes of an attorney fees award identified by this Court in Driver. Therefore, the 
Harrisons respecthlly request that the Court vacate the award of attorney fees entered by the 
district court. 
G. Lloyd's is not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Finally, Lloyd's has requested attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code 5 12- 
121 and Idaho Code 5 7-914. The Court has repeatedly held that fees are to be awarded 
under Idaho Code 5 12-121 only if the Court "is left with the abiding belief that the appeal 
was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation." See, e.g., 
Rowley v. Fuhrman, 135 Idaho 105, 110,982 P.2d 940 (1999). Lloyd's asserts that fees are 
appropriate because the Harrisons have simply asked the Court to second guess the 
Arbitrator's and District Court's decisions. 
The Harrisons strongly assert that fees are inappropriate in this matter. First, 
the Harrisons assert that fees are inappropriate because Lloyd's will not be the prevailing 
party on this appeal. Secondly, as is set forth above, the Harrisons have submitted evidence 
and argument in support of their position that the District Court misapplied the law in this 
matter. The Harrisons have asserted that the District Court's decision regarding the 
application of the IAA is inconsistent with prior case law from this Court and has made good 
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faith arguments in support of this issue. Additionally, because the district court never 
reached the issue of the manifest disregard of the law, it cannot be frivolous or unreasonable 
to ask this Court to address that issue. To adopt Lloyd's argument would be change the 
standard of Idaho Code 5 12-121 from a frivolous standard to one where a party is entitled to 
fees upon appeal of any legal decision whenever that party prevails on appeal. Any appeal of 
legal (rather than factual) decision asks the Court to second guess the district court's legal 
determinations. It is certainly not the intent of Idaho Code 5 12-121, nor consistent with the 
Court's interpretation of that statute, to award fees when a party brings a good faith appeal 
supported by evidentiary and legal arguments demonstrated why the District Court erred. 
See, e.g., Tolley v. Thi Company, 140 Idaho 253, 262-263, 92 P.3d 503, 512-513 (2004) 
(upholding the district court's decision not to award fees under Idaho Code 5 12-121 and 
declining to award fees on appeal under that statute where the party's legal argument may 
have been incorrect but was not plainly fallacious). As such, Lloyd's request for fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-121 should be denied. 
Lloyd's request for fees pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-914 should also be denied 
for the reasons fully set forth in Section 1II.F. of this brief, as well as the arguments on 
attorney fees set forth within the Harrisons' opening brief on appeal. Lloyd's further argues 
that fees are appropriate under this statute because the Harrisons have only argued that the 
Arbitrator made factual and legal errors which are not recognized bases for vacating 
arbitration awards. As is fully set forth within the Harrisons' Opening Brief and this Reply 
Brief, the Harrisons have identified and argued that the arbitration award should be vacated 
based on the specific provisions allow such an award to be vacated under both the IAA and 
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the FAA. The factual and legal errors identified by the Harrisons are not simply errors but 
are in manifest disregard of the record and the law applicable to this matter. The Harrisons 
have provided legal argument and citations to the record to support this argument. 
Therefore, to award fees in this matter would, in effect, turn Idaho Code 5 7-914 into a 
prevailing party fee provision. That is not what the statute intended and it is not the standard 
the Court has identified for that provision. As such, Lloyd's request for attorney fees on 
appeal under Idaho Code 7-914 should be denied. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Throughout its briefing, Lloyd's has repeatedly accused the Harrisons of doing 
nothing more than askiig this Court to review factual and legal errors made by the Arbitrator 
in this matter. The Harrisons recognize, a s  they have from the beginning, that the Court's 
review of an arbitration decision is limited. However, it is undisputed that both the Idaho 
legislature and the United States Congress recognized that there are some instances in which 
an arbitration decision should be vacated and made provision for those instances within the 
IAA and the FAA. The Harrisons are not asking the Court to weigh the degree of error of 
law or fact. The errors are not mere misinterpretations of the law. These are not legal or 
factual fidings for which there are two plausible conclusions. The factual errors are not the 
type where there is some, no matter how little, evidence to support. The legal errors are not 
the type where there is some authority, however minor, to support them. Rather, these are 
errors which are in direct conflict with established Idaho law and in direct conflict with the 
undisputed facts placed before the Arbitrator. Thus, the Harrisons are not asking this Court 
to subvert the rule of limited review but rather are asking this Court to recognize that this 
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case falls squarely within the exceptions provided for by the Idaho Legislature and United 
States Congress. As such, the Harrisons respectfully request that the Court reverse the 
district court's order confirming the arbitration award and remand this case for further 
proceedings. The Harrisons further request the Court reverse the district court's award of 
attorney fees to Lloyd's in this matter and deny Lloyd's request for attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this \$ day of July, 2009. 
ROSSMAN LAW GROW, PLLC 
BY 
Erica S. Phillips 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3 day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
US Mail Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Overnight Mail Joseph N. Pirtle 
Hand Delivery ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
Facsimile No. 384-5844 Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
L S.P* 
Erica S. Phillips 
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APPENDIX 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
H. RAY HARRISON and SULiE HARRISON, ) 
husband and wife, 1 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S 
LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NO. 
200567 ISSUED TO JEFFREY HARTFORD, 
M.D. EFFECTIVE FROM JUNE 1,2004 TO 
JUNE 1,2005 WITH AN RETROACTIVE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF JUNE 1,2003; NAS 





1 ORDER DENYING 
1 INVOLUNTARY MOTION TO 
) DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE 
1 
1 Supreme Court Docket No. 35678 
) Ada County Case No. 2006-15687 
j 




An INVOLUNTARY MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE, MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF INVOLUNTARY MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE and AFFIDAVIT OF 
JEFFREY A. ,THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF INVOLUNTARY MOTION TO DISMISS WITH 
PREJUDICE with attachments were filed by counsel for Respondents on September 25, 2008. 
Thereafter, a MEMORANDUM fiV OPPOSITION TO INVOLUNTARY MOTION TO DISMISS 
WITH PREJUDICE was filed by counsel for Appellants on October 9, 2008. The Court is fully 
advised; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents' INVOLUNTARY MOTION TO DISMISS 
WITH PREJUDICE be, and hereby is, DENIED. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the above entitled appeal shall proceed accordingly and the 
due date for the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be reset unless otherwise provided by 
an Order of this Court. 
DATED this 3 1' day of October 2008. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
.. . District Court Clerk 
~ o & ' ~ e ~ d 8 e r ' D i k m e  Crornwell 
8 y b  r w  
Stephen W. Kenyon, clerk 
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